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I. INTRODUCTION
The increased Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") flows in the past few
years have strengthened the belief among many developing countries,
especially African countries, that such FDI flows could help in reducing the
resource, technology and foreign exchange gaps that constrain their
economic development.' As a result, many developing countries have been
* Legal Officer, Development Law Service, the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization ("FAO"), Viale delle Terme di Caracalla, Rome, Italy. Any opinions expressed
are strictly personal and should not be attributed to FAO or any other United Nations agency.
The author is grateful to Susan Rhee for excellent editorial and substantive comments. The
author is also thankful to his students at the 2004 and 2005 LL.M (Trade and Investment
Law) program at the Universities of the Western Cape and Pretoria in South Africa
respectively, who engaged with some of the issues raised in this paper. All errors are the
author's own responsibility.
I CARLOS CORREA & NAGESH KUMAR, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT: IMPLICATIONS
OF A WTO REGIME AND POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2003). FDI in this sense is only one aspect of the
commonly mentioned broad term, "capital flows," which refers to different kinds of
transactions, including: both short-term and long-term lending from banking institutions;
investments in the purchase of public or private bonds; investment in equities; and direct
investment in productive capacity. Depending on the quantities of such flows, each has a
different impact on the rate of "economic growth" and certainly, different levels of risk. For
a discussion of the definitions of "investment" and its constituent elements, see U.N. Conf.
on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), Scope and Definition: UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/ll(Vol.II) (Jan. 1,
1999). Several papers submitted to the WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between
Trade and Investment, especially those on "Scope and Definitions" are useful in indicating
the various differences between WTO Members in the understanding of what exactly
constitutes foreign investment. See Communication from China, Scope and Definition,
WT/WGTI/W/159 (Apr. 14, 2003); Communication from Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Scope and Definition, WT/WGTI/W/126 (June 28,
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diligently working to attract foreign investment, for which these countries
give some of the highest returns;2 in the process, these countries make
concessions that they would have found unthinkable in the past, when
autarchic economic policies were prevalent.3  For example, due to the
liberalization of capital accounts, a foreign investor in Kenya is guaranteed
limitless capital and interest repatriation and dividends remittance as long
2002); Communication from the European Communities, Concept Paper on the Definition
and Scope of Investment, WTIWGTI/W/1 15 (Apr. 16, 2002); Communication from Korea,
Scope and Definition, WT/WGTI/W/l 14 (Apr. 14, 2002); Communication from Japan,
Scope and Definition, WT/WGTI/W/1 11 (Apr. 12, 2002). See also Working Group on the
Relationship Between Trade & Inv., Note by the Secretariat: Scope and Definitions:
Investment and Investors, WT/WGTI/W/1 08 (Mar. 21, 2002).
2 WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES
AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS 56 (2002) (noting that: "any country that starts out
with low capital will offset this unlucky heritage with very high returns to capital. Since
international finance capital flows to countries with the highest rate of return... capital will
flow to this high-return, low capital country.") Of course this particular assertion that capital
follows investment returns is rather simplistic and does not quite capture the nuances that
inform the choice of location in an investment decision-making process. See Clive Crook,
Why Does So Little Capital Flow from Rich Countries to Poor?, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2003
(discussing the theory that capital bottled up in individual rich countries should flow into
poorer ones with higher returns works "only sometimes," not always). According to some
commentators, the theory:
did work for sustained periods during the past century or two. In the last quarter of the 19
th
Century, British capital equivalent to five percent of host country Gross Domestic Product
("GDP") and more flowed out each year to the United States, Canada, France, Australia and
Argentina. France and Germany were big exporters of capital too. The flows paid for a large
part of the investment undertaken in the capital-importing countries. This golden age of
financial globalization ended in 1914.
Id.
3 This thinking promoted the idea of domestic savings as opposed to over-reliance on
external financial injections into developing countries. Its most influential exponent was the
Argentinean economist, Dr. Raul Pr6bisch, who cautioned in 1971 that:
if the next few years are to witness a transition to a satisfactory rate of development,
investment with domestic resources will have to increase .... To allow a considerable
external debt to pile up, without energetically promoting the mobilization of the region's own
resources until the point was reached at which they could fully meet capital formation
requirements, would be to invite deplorable consequences.
RAUL PRIEBISCH, CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: LATIN AMERICA'S GREAT TASK 11 (1971). See
also Raul Pr6bisch, Five Stages in My Thinking on Development, in PIONEERS IN
DEVELOPMENT 175, 177 (Gerald M. Meier & Dudley Seers eds., 1984) (stating that he was
merely articulating ideas that countries were already implementing: "In reality, my policy
proposal sought to provide theoretical justification for the industrialization policy which was
already being followed (especially by the large countries of Latin America) to encourage the
others to follow it, too, and to provide ... an orderly strategy for carrying this out.")
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as he can show that he has already paid the requisite taxes.4 Besides
domestic law, provisions granting more or less similar opportunities for
foreign investors have been included in the various Bilateral Investment
Treaties ("BITs") that have been signed by African countries over the years.
The majority of developing countries and least developed countries
are, at present, importers and, to a much lesser extent among a few of them,
exporters of foreign investment, a factor which impacts both their policy
and legislative controls over foreign investment . At the same time, without
exception, these countries abide by the prevailing orthodoxy that FDI is a
major pre-condition for their economic advancement. 6 The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") has come to the
conclusion that "developing countries need a substantial inflow of external
resources in order to fill the savings and foreign exchange gaps associated
with rapid rate of capital accumulation and growth needed to overcome
widespread poverty and to lift standards to acceptable levels." 7 In contrast
to such assertions, other studies have asserted that "investment... [does]
4 Foreign Investment Protection Act § 3(2) (1976) (Kenya), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.com/theForeignlnvestmentsProtectionAct.htm; see also UNCTAD,
Investment Policy Review: Kenya, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2005/8 (July 2005);
Akilano M. Akiwumi, The Need for the Harmonization of African Investment Laws, 2
AFRICA & L. INT'L REV. 1, 5 (Oct. 1985) (surveying investment laws of various African
countries, discussing how they were designed purely to "attract" foreign investors, and
noting the welcoming and unrestricted nature of African investment laws) [hereinafter
Harmonization of African Investment Laws]. Akiwumi writes that "many African investment
laws make no distinction between foreign private investment and locally generated
investment and show little or no regard for the nationality of the investor." Id. And with
respect to the standard of treatment, Akiwumi goes on: "Both foreign and private local
investment, if they qualify for favoured treatment, receive equal treatment before the law and
are eligible for the same incentives except for the repatriation of capital remittance of profits
and protection from nationalization .... " Id.
5 Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade & Inv., Note by Secretariat:
Development Provisions, WT/WGTI/W/ 119 (June 11, 2002).
6 The wisdom that currently holds sway is attributed to economic policies promoted by
the World Bank and other multilateral economic institutions. According to the World Bank:
The future of the developing countries is largely in their own hands .... The right strategy
for the developing countries, whether external conditions are supportive or not, is to invest in
people, including education, health, and population control; help domestic markets to work
well by fostering competition and investing in infrastructure; liberalize trade and foreign
investment; avoid excessive fiscal deficits and high inflation.
UNCTAD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 149 (1991), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/ (emphasis added).
7 UNCTAD, Capital Flows and Growth in Africa, 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/MPB7
(Oct. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Capital Flows and Growth in Africa]. See also UNCTAD,
Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2003/1 (2003).
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not have a tight link to growth in the short run, and not even much of a link
in the long run in Africa' 8 and that "investment does not necessarily
promote growth." 9  Other scholars have concluded that "while many
analysts decry the lack of sufficient investment in Africa, [there is] no
evidence that private and public investment are productive." 10  On the
concept of "savings" upon which the argument that Africa needs foreign
capital injections rests, its veracity has been termed "questionable" and
arguments have been advanced that Africa does not in fact suffer from "low
savings rates," leaving an "investment gap" that then has to be filled in by
FDIs. 1  Writers that hold this view have challenged the truth behind
UNCTAD's claims and have stated that Africa's savings rate is high, but
that some savings are not described as such by the dominant economic
literature. 12
Suffice it to say, these are largely academic issues, and mainly in the
realm of economists. They do, however, paint an ideal background for the
main issues in this paper, and serve to show why there is increasingly
serious concern on how to regulate FDI inflows and how best to make such
inflows contribute towards realizing the development aspirations of poor
economies. The dimensions of the regulatory difficulties that developing
countries face revolve around conflicts between investors and host
countries. Sometimes there are disagreements concerning the distribution
of benefits and differences regarding the role of investment in development,
to the extent that one of the enduring points of opposition to a multilateral
agreement on investment is the pervasive role of multinational corporations,
which are the primary vehicles for FDI movement. While on the one hand
many developing countries insist that they should retain some measure of
control over foreign investors, including foreign multinationals (particularly
regarding location, profit repatriation and other performance requirements
such as employment and technology transfer), foreign investors do not want
8 See DAVID DOLLAR & WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE SEARCH FOR THE KEY: AID,
INVESTMENT AND POLICIES IN AFRICA 3 (1999); see also WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS 47-
59 (2002).
9 See DOLLAR, supra note 8, at 23; See also Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Attract FDI?: Only a bit.. .and they could bite (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 3121, June 2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org (stating that contrary to
popular perception, liberalization efforts through signing bilateral investment treaties do not
in fact lead to significant increases in investment flows).
10 Shantayanan Devarajan, et al., Low Investment is Not the Constraint on African
Development (2002) (Working Paper No. 13), available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/2778.
11 Yash Tandon, African Meeting - Discussion Notes: The Role of Foreign Direct
Investment in Africa's Human Development (May 10, 2000), http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/




their transaction costs to be increased by seemingly burdensome
requirements beyond the evaluation and entry process. Foreign investors are
therefore usually keen to know what standards of "treatment" (such as 'fair
and equitable treatment') they will be subjected to upon entry. Many
investment disputes hinge on the standards of treatment accorded to a
foreign investor. 3 Until a few years back, ideological differences hinging
on the merits of private as opposed to public enterprise, and the contention
by some scholars and policy makers that foreign investment is a form of
economic imperialism, were also prominent points of divergence in the
approaches to foreign investment regulation.' In most African countries
today, the desire for FDI overwhelmingly precludes the possibility of
effectively using the results of a thorough analysis of economic, political,
and social or other gains that may come from such inflows, and therefore
what laws and policies need to be erected to realize such gains.1
5
13 AHMAD KHALAF MASA'DEH, INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL
POLICY: PROSPECTS FOR WTO LAW 45 (2004) (noting that "The legal treatment of FDI
channeled by MNEs has traditionally been a fertile source for conflict.") For an early view
on this, see also Harmonization of African Investment Laws, arguing that:
since most African countries are capital importing and therefore depend on outside sources
rather than internal or African sources to finance development, they must, if they do not
cooperate in the spirit of collective reliance, perforce dance to the tune of the one that pays
the piper. Their laws must reflect the protection which the foreigner expects and if the laws
do not so provide, investment contracts are made and official assurances are given. Thus, we
find that in several cases, the investment laws make inordinately generous concessions to the
foreign investor.
Harmonization of African Investment Laws, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added).
14 AHMAD KHALAF MASA'DEH, INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL
POLICY: PROSPECTS FOR WTO LAW 45 (2004) (noting that "The communist oriented Soviet
Revolution also affected some notions related to FDI.... [I]t enhanced the idea that
nationalisation of FDI for economic reform is possible ....") See also E.I. NWOGUGU, THE
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9-10 (1965); G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-11 (1969). For an
erudite critique of the intersections between international law, globalization and
development, and the place of the third world, see Joel Ngugi, Making New Wine for Old
Wine-Skins: Can the Reform of International Law Emancipate the Third World in the Age of
Globalization? 8 UC DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 73 (Winter 2002).
15 In other instances, foreign investment (and a fortiori, foreign aid), has been used
negatively by some government regimes and has had disastrous effects. For example, the
immediate former governing regime in Kenya did everything possible to attract foreign
investment and foreign aid, which "enabled the party to acquire the amount of force it
needed and keep all other political demands permanently out of power by silencing actors
who insisted against [the country's] undemocratic regime." Berhane G. Mariam, Challenges
to Democratic and Economic Transition in Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan: A Comparative
Study of the Political, Economic and Social Structures in the Three Countries 133 (2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg), available at
http://docserver.bis.uni-oldenburg.de/publikationen/dissertation/2002/marchaO2/
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:95 (2005)
Under customary international law, the autonomy and ability of a State
to regulate such inward foreign investment flows arises out of its
sovereignty.' 6 As such, there is no right of admission or right to invest in a
foreign country. States retain the power, at least theoretically, to determine
which foreign investors or investments to allow, under what conditions, and
in what sectors. 17 Within their national laws, countries are therefore free to
make provisions for appropriate controls or to deny entry to foreign
companies as they might see fit. With respect to businesses with branches
or subsidiaries in other countries, some early commentators noted this
residual power in the state as follows:
By virtue of the phenomenon of frontiers which come between home
offices and various branch offices [of transnational enterprises], each
state may provide a different set of rules for the branches which are on
its territory and subject to its control. The universality of the business
concern cannot be realized unless all of its parts are in the same country
(which is the case in a national business concern), otherwise there
results a veritable juridical splitting-up. 8
In this sense, "national business concern" refers to a business that is
wholly registered and therefore has the nationality of the host state, one that
is in some way under the full or partial jurisdiction of the host state perhaps
because some of its shareholders are nationals of that particular state. Many
countries retain a screening criterion that is largely unimplemented. Under
Kenya's Foreign Investment Protection Act, foreign investment is only
allowed if it promotes economic development or is "likely to benefit" the
marcha02.html.
16 According to Sornarajah, the right of a State to control foreign direct investment is
based on the international law regarding aliens and the right of a State to deny entry to such
aliens. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 83 (1994).
Fatouros extends the rights of States in this regard to cover "trade and foreign investors." See
A.A. FATOUROS, Towards an International Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment? 10
ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 181, 193 (1995).
17 Samuel K.B. Asante argues that:
a state has the right to regulate the entry of foreign capital or investment into its territory.
This involves the right to exclude foreign investment or impose conditions on the entry of
foreign investment or the acquisition of property by foreign capital or the operations of
foreign companies in the territory of the host state, and the exercise of general jurisdiction
over such companies.
Samuel K.B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal, 37 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 589, 606 (1988).




Kenyan economy.' 9 Any rights or obligations that an investor may have
with respect to foreign investment in a host State are therefore born of
treaties and other instruments of international law negotiated by choice
with or among other States. National laws on or touching upon investment
also play a role in defining the rights and obligations of foreign investors
once they have secured entry into the host state. In this regard, they are
complementary to any rights and obligations contained in treaties and other
international law instruments. The problem is that national legislation of the
majority of developing countries is spurred by the single-minded purpose of
investment attraction. Hence, the concessions granted to foreign investors
are almost always overly extensive, and worse, might limit the possibility of
meaningful one-off, investor-state negotiations.
As is well known, there is currently no comprehensive multilateral
instrument for the regulation of foreign investment. Foreign investment is
therefore only subject to a motley of BITs, regional investment treaties,
and, at the multilateral level, the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
limited-scope Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures
("TRIMs") 0 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS").
21
At the regional level in Africa, cross-border investment regulation
frameworks are in their nascent stages. In the Southern Africa
Development Community ("SADC"), for example, the trade protocol
provides rather vaguely that "Member States shall adopt policies and
implement measures within the Community to promote an open cross-
border investment regime, thereby enhancing economic development,
diversification and industrialization., 22 Some commentators have indicated
that the protocol has indeed resulted in "increased business opportunities"
in the region, which may be attributed to a liberalized investment climate.23
19 Foreign Investment Protection Act §3(1) (1981) (Kenya), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.com/theForeignIlnvestmentsProtectionAct.htm.
20 See Trade-Related Aspects of Investment Measures, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 143-46 (1999). For a
good analysis of the narrow scope of the agreement, see Patrick Low and Arvind
Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished Business Presentation at the
Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies World Bank Conference (Jan. 26, 1995).
2' General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
22 Declaration and Treaty of South African Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992,
Protocol on Trade, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. 116 (1993). See generally Rose Thomas, Why
Increasing Investment into SADC is Critical for Improving the Region's Ability to Trade,
Presentation at the NEPAD Opportunities for Africa's Business, Entrepreneurs and SME
Communities (Apr. 22, 2002).
23 See Samson Muradzikwa, Foreign Investment in SADC 9 (Univ. of Cape Town Dev.
Policy Research Unit, Working Paper No. 02/67, 2002), available at
http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/dpru/WorkingPapers/wp.asp?WPID=2002/67 ("[T]he
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There has been discussion within the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern African ("COMESA") on the creation of a "common investment
area," although this is also at its initial stages.2 4  Given the fledgling
regional approach to investment regulation in the region, BITs between
African countries and countries from other parts of the world have been the
main way through which investment has been controlled or managed.
At the multilateral level, the debate as to whether or not there should
be a proper and comprehensive multilateral framework on investment has
continued unabated since the idea was mooted in the first WTO Ministerial
Meeting at Singapore in 1996. The 1996 WTO Annual Report stated that
one of the options WTO members should consider is integrating the
disparate investment agreements "into a comprehensive and global
framework that recognizes the close linkages between trade and
investment., 25  With the failure to agree on whether to embark on
negotiations for a multilateral framework at the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancun in September 2003 (as some contend it had been
agreed in the language of the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration)26 and the
SADC states have eased restrictions on foreign entry and ownership, although some still
maintain restrictions either on foreign and/or private ownership in certain sectors considered
as strategic.") See also Paul Kalenga, Regional Trade Integration in Southern Africa:
Critical Policy Issues (Univ. of Cape Town Dev. Policy Research Unit, Working Paper No.
00/42, 2000); Sheila Page, Some Implications of the SADC Trade Protocol (Trade & Indus.
Policy Strategies, Working Paper No. 2, 1997) (on file with author).
24 A discussion paper posted on the COMESA website recounts efforts towards the
creation of the investment area. See COMESA, Implementing the COMESA Investment Area,
at http://www.comesa.int/investment. It states as follows:
The Authority of Heads of States and Government at its meeting in Kinshasa, Democratic
Republic of Congo decided that the COMESA region should become a Common Investment
Area (CCIA). The overall objective of establishing the CCIA is to enable the region to attract
greater and sustainable levels of investment into the region through creating an international
competitive investment area, which allows for free movement of capital, labour, goods and
services across borders of Member States. The creation of a CCIA is particularly useful, as
national markets in most COMESA countries are too small to attract investment on their
own. Furthermore, multinationals, fund managers and other investors now give preference to
regional, rather than national markets in making decisions where to invest.
Id.
25 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 59 (Geneva 1996).
26 Paragraph 20 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration stated as follows:
Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and
predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct
investment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade, and the need for enhanced technical
assistance and capacity-building in this area as referred to in paragraph 21, we agree that
negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis
of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.
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still polarized views on the issue, it is unclear how long the issue of
investment will be off the table at the WTO. What is clear however is that,
more than ever before, developing countries are angling for FDI and doing
everything possible to make such flows a reality. The creation of a
favorable environment for the free flow of FDI is a development strategy
that is increasingly central in government policies throughout the
developing world. One way through which countries have endeavored to
make themselves attractive to FDI has been by signing BITs that offer
various protections to foreign investment.27 By the end of 2002, a total of
533 BITs, to which an African country was a party, had been signed.28 For
the 53 countries in the continent, this works out to an average of ten BITs
per country.29
This paper argues that as these countries struggle to attract FDI, they
have signed BITs in which they have made commitments that are
inconsistent with their stated reasons against a multilateral agreement on
See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of Nov. 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746
(2002). The meaning of the phrase "explicit consensus" generated quite a bit of controversy
in the run-up to the subsequent ministerial meeting in Cancun.
27 See Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 9, at 22 (stating, to the contrary, that "[a]nalyzing
twenty years of bilateral FDI flows from the OECD to developing countries finds little
evidence that BITs have stimulated additional investment.") However, she also
acknowledges that:
[a] BIT could help attract investment by serving as a commitment device. It is hypothesized
that countries with weak domestic property rights can increase their attractiveness as a
potential host by explicitly committing themselves to honouring the property rights of foreign
investors. In particular, a BIT could be a commitment device to overcome dynamic
inconsistency problems. Hosts would have an incentive to make those promises necessary to
bring investors in, but once the sunk costs are made, the host then has the incentive to deliver
only to the level that will keep the investor from leaving. The presence of the BIT, with its
dispute resolution mechanisms and provisions for compensation in the case of expropriation,
guard against host country actions that would adversely impact the profitability of the
investment.
Id. at 2. To facilitate the process of signing BITs, UNCTAD "launched an initiative ... to
give developing countries and particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs) an
opportunity to negotiate bilateral investment treaties for the promotion and protection of
investment and double taxation treaties." See UNCTAD, Round of Negotiations of Bilateral
Investment Treaties for English-Speaking African Least Developed Countries: Final Report
(July 4, 2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-pcbb/docs/
ditepcbbjias0012en.pdf. Several rounds of negotiations have been organized since 1999.
The session held from June 30 to July 4, 2003 yielded nineteen BITs, six of which were
signed at the UNCTAD XI, in Brazil. See UNCTAD XI, Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Signing Ceremony, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Event 149.aspx?
selected=conclusions (last updated July 10, 2004).
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foreign investment. They may therefore preclude the possibility of
reasonably resisting such an agreement for much longer. In addition, these
BITs have resulted in a corresponding diminishment of the policy space
available for them to channel FDI inflows in a manner that corresponds to
and meets their development needs.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part II charts the history of trade and
foreign investment in Africa. Part III focuses on the antecedents to the
development of standards for foreign investment regulation by host states.
Part IV broadly discusses BITs, their popularity, content and trends, in
particular regarding their scope of application, market access, establishment
and investment protection, and dispute settlement. Part V discusses the
possibility that BITs could give rise to elements of customary international
law on investment.
II. A REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF TRADE AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN AFRICA
It has been estimated that by 1913 foreign investment in sub-Saharan
Africa, most of which originated from European countries, stood at about
$3.3 billion;30 by 1929, this figure had doubled to about $6 billion.31 As a
percentage of the total volume of global foreign investment, sub-Saharan
African's share amounted to about four percent in 1913 and about seven
percent in 1929.32 By comparison with recent estimates, on the average,
this figure seems to have declined. As reported in UNCTAD's World
Investment Report, for example, in 2001 sub-Saharan Africa received about
2.3% of the total global volume of FDI flows. 33 A dramatic decline in FDI
inflows was recorded in 2002.34 Despite unprecedented efforts by African
countries to attract foreign investment, investment has actually declined.
As in modem times, South Africa dominated the African continent's
trade and investment sector in the 1800s due mainly to the discovery and
profitable exploitation of mineral wealth and the presence of a zealous
entrepreneurial class. In 1885, the year before the discovery of the
Witwatersrand goldfields, South Africa's volume of foreign trade amounted
to about $65 million. By 1897, this figure had risen to $220 million, which
amounted to about two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa's foreign trade.35 From
this point on, it is reported that "South Africa therefore became a major
market for European overseas investment." 36 This fact remains so today.
30 j. D. FAGE & WILLIAM TORDOFF, A HISTORY OF AFRICA 238 (2002).
31 id.
32 Id.
33 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 13-14 (2002).
34 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 8-9 (2003).




In UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2003, South Africa was cited as
one of the highest recipients of FDI in Africa, with flows of up to 40% of
the total continental inflows. Its companies were also the most active in
investing elsewhere in the continent.37
The principal interest that the colonial powers had in Africa was rooted
in economic benefit, basically trade and investment, from the start.
According to economic historians, "the acquisition of colonies was
necessary if there was to be major growth in European foreign trade and
industry."38 European powers simply had to have new markets and new
sources of cheap raw materials and labor if their industrial and commercial
growth was to be maintained. To take the case of Germany for example,
John D. Hargreaves, a leading authority on African and imperial history,
eloquently captured the drive for expansionism, fueled by an interesting
mix of political influence, imperial ambitions and the search for commercial
opportunities. He states that Count Otto von Bismarck, who served as
Germany's Chancellor for the latter part of the nineteenth century, at first
was reluctant to defend Germany's overseas trading interests by acquirinA
colonies or by other methods likely to create conflicts with other powers.
Due in part to the "growth of imperialist sentiment among the German
public and intellectuals and to the development of German foreign trade,"
Bismarck later changed his approach and proclaimed sovereignty over
substantial sections of the African coast.40 This opened up opportunities to
German traders, for, as Hargreaves notes:
It is true that since the 1830's traders from Hanseatic ports had been
operating in West Africa with increasing success. The most important
firm was that founded by Carl Woermann of Hamburg; entering the
Liberian trade in 1849, by 1884 his house had achieved a dominant
position in that state, spread successfully to Gabon and the Cameroons,
and opened regular steamship services to the coast. Adolph Woermann,
who succeeded his father as head of the firm in 1880, was a man of
influence in German politics, a National Liberal Deputy to the Reichstag
after 1884, a friend and reputedly a confidant of Bismarck himself. In a
manner reminiscent of the history of Regis, Woermann's business
spawned others, as former agents struck out independently in the
African trade, using capital and experience acquired in the service of the
parent firm.4'
Additionally, some historians have attributed the scramble to the
37 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT (2003).
38 FAGE, supra note 30, at 328.
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opening of a major British investment in 1869, the Suez Canal. Other
European powers were alive to the strategic and commercial importance of
the canal and were interested in having their own high-value acquisitions.
The British whetted the imperial appetites of other Europeans, notably the
Germans and the French, even further by their discovery of valuable
minerals in South Africa shortly after the opening of the Suez Canal.42
These desires resulted in the partition of Africa at the 1885 Berlin
Conference, attended by representatives from Britain, Austria-Hungary,
France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Portugal, Denmark, Spain,
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Turkey. The conference
yielded the General Act of 26 February 1885 in which the colonial powers
demarcated their spheres of economic and political influence.43
Recent scholarship also notes the centrality of the trade theme to the
conference. "Issues concerning free trade in the Congo basin, and free
navigation of the Congo and Niger rivers were intensely discussed." 4 The
resulting document, the General Act, was basically an economic treaty
between the conference participants, stating in Article I that the "commerce
of all nations shall enjoy complete liberty, ' ' 5 and in Article III that
"[m]erchandise of every origin imported into these territories, under
whatever flag it may be, by route of sea or river or land, shall have to
discharge no other taxes than those which may be collected as an equitable
compensation for expenses useful to commerce., 46 "[T]hese territories"
were, of course, a reference to Africa. According to Article IV, it was also
agreed that merchandise would not be subject to any import or transit
duties.47 In effect, the treaty created a "free for all, take what you get"
trading regime, with the most stringent caveat being a minor notification
requirement in Article XXXIV of the General Act, to the effect that any
new "territory" acquisitions, subsequent to the conference, would have to be
notified to the "other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to put
them in a condition to make available, if there be occasion for it, their
reclamations. 48
Following the successful partitioning, the metropolitan imperial
powers imposed their legal and trading regime on the territories that were
under their occupation. In British colonial Africa, for example, alongside
42 See generally id. § 7.
43 See General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the Congo, 3 Am. J. INT'L L. 7
(Supp. 1909).
44 Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 58 (1999).
45 GeneralAct, supra note 43, at art. I.
46 Id. at art. III.
471 Id. at art. IV.
48 Anghie, supra note 44, at 61. According to Anghie, this provision was at best vague, as
"[n]o clarity existed as to how or in which forum such claims were to be resolved." Id.
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the introduction of a currency economy, the native population was also
subject to English common law. The trade and investment regime that
existed was therefore controlled and directed to the benefit of the imperial
powers. The rights and obligations of investors were defined and
circumscribed in accordance with the domestic law of the imperial power.
Investors in the colonies, though in fact "foreign investors," could never be
defined as such because they were private citizens dealing with their own
governments and on the basis of their own laws, 49 which had been
transplanted to these far-off lands during the colonial experiment.5 °
As indicated earlier, "foreign investors" in Africa during the colonial
period were invariably dealing with their own governments and were,
therefore, not really "foreign investors" as we understand the phrase today.
Further, the understanding was that each European power, having carved its
own niche in Africa, would confine itself to this sphere of influence. From
necessity, the mutual suspicion and unbridled imperialist ambitions of the
European powers, and their tense relations, made it possible for them to
keep to their own demarcated turfs, at least during peace time. There was,
therefore, never any need to set down further agreements on trade and
49 Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Arbitration, in DFM DOCUMENT SERIES, DOCUMENT No. 1:
DEBT RE-STRUCTURING 23 (U.N. Institute of Training & Research 1992).
50 When the British colonial enterprise was nearing its universal demise, the limits of the
idea of transplantability of law came to be recognized more accurately, perhaps, as a
function of the chastisement resulting from a failed empire initiative. In Nyali Ld. v. Attorney
General, Lord Denning famously acknowledged that: "Just as with the English oak, so with
the English common law. You cannot transplant it to the African continent and expect it to
retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish indeed, but it needs careful
tending." See Nyali Ld. v. Attorney General, 1 Q.B. 1, 16 (Eng. C.A. 1956). This
acknowledgment led to a certain degree of regard (if a tinge disdainful) for existing
structures and norms. Deference to existing African structures of governance, practices, and
norms is not a new phenomenon to the Western world, especially when it is in the Western
world's best interests to do so. For example, the idea of "indirect rule" in British colonial
Africa was never out of some benevolent understanding of the ramifications of a total
subjugation of a people. It was, rather, a realization that the so-called "dual mandate" could
only be best and most cost-effectively achieved by utilizing the existing tribal administrative
structures so that, according to Frederick Lugard, the architect of "indirect rule," the
"industrial classes of Europe could gain their due reward for using their brains, capital and
energy, in developing the resources of Africa." See FREDERICK LUGARD, THE DUAL
MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA 617 (1965). Lugard further states:
Let it be admitted from the outset that European brains, capital and energy have not been, and
never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure
philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes,
and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made
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investment regarding the colonies.
Between the United States, many European powers, and other U.S.
allies, there were a number of treaties on friendship, commerce and
navigation ("FCN") that included investment protection provisions. 51 The
first of these FCN treaties was signed between the United States and France
in 1778.52 It could be said that African territories under occupation by
European powers that signed FCN treaties were also subject to such
treaties. For much of the period in which Africa was under colonial rule,
formal trade and investment remained under the complete legal and political
control of the imperial occupying power and, despite talk about a "dual
mandate" within the hierarchy of the British colonial administration, were
really directed towards the exclusive economic benefit of the occupying
powers.
III. THE ANTECEDENTS TO DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION
After the Second World War, however, things began to change. The
independence struggle was then in its nascent stage in much of the
developing world. At the time of the Havana Conference in 1947, few
developing countries could take part in the negotiations as independent
states. From Africa, only Egypt, Liberia, Southern Rhodesia and South
Africa took part.53 Having gone through the Second World War and the
destruction that resulted, European powers were most interested in
reconstruction and development. They wanted to be sure that they would
retain the ability to direct any investments, whether local or foreign, in a
manner that would yield the most benefit to their economies. They were,
therefore, not very keen on a strong multilateral control process.
Whereas the text of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade54 did not have any provisions specifically dealing with investment,
51 KENNETH J. VANDERVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND
PRACTICE (1992).
52 Id. at 14.
53 The following developing countries were also represented at Havana: Afghanistan,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, the Republic of
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines,
Syria, Transjordan, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization and Final Act and
Related Documents, Havana, Cuba, November 21, 1947, to March 24, 1948, available at
http://www.wto.org/English/docs e/legal e/havanae.pdf [hereinafter Havana Charter]. See
also Tatsuro Kunugi, State Succession in the Framework of GA 7T, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 268
(1965).
54 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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the stillborn Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization
("ITO") contained a separate chapter on "Restrictive Business Practices,"
including several provisions on the regulation of foreign investment. 55 To
put this into context, by this time, the hitherto great world powers such as
the United Kingdom, France and Germany had ceased to be capital
exporting countries and were faced with an upsurge in American foreign
investment after the war. They therefore had to erect, or leave space for,
formal and informal mechanisms to ensure that their national interests were
protected. During this time, the formal mechanisms that these countries
used included foreign exchange controls and regulations against foreign
investment in sensitive sectors, such as defense and cultural industries. 6
Informally, they used mechanisms such as "takeover restrictions,
undertakings and voluntary restrictions by transnational corporations in
order to restrict foreign investment and impose performance
requirements. ' , 57 To leave enough room for such controls, the Havana
Charter provided in Article 12:1(c) that each member was allowed "to
determine whether and, to what extent and upon what terms it will allow
future foreign investment' 58 and "to take any appropriate safeguards
necessary to ensure that foreign investment is not used as a basis for
interference in its internal affairs or national policies. 5 9
As is well known, the Havana Charter never entered into force, as it
was repeatedly rejected by the United States Congress. Recalling that the
GATT 1947 had no specific provisions on investment, it should not be
surprising that for many years thereafter, the GATT played a very marginal
role as a multilateral forum for the control of measures regulating foreign
investment. In 1955, GATT Contracting Parties adopted a resolution,
International Investment for Economic Development.6  The resolution
recognized that an increase in the flow of capital into countries in need of
foreign investment, especially developing countries, would contribute
towards the achievement of the objectives of the GATT.
It was recommended that countries in a position to provide capital for
international investment and those which desired to obtain such capital,
55 Havana Charter, supra note 53. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing
Countries, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 67, 71 (1992); CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR
WORLD TRADE 141 (1949); WILLIAMS ADAMS BROWN, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE
RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE ITO CHARTER AND
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 30-33 (1950).
56 HA-JOON CHANG & DUNCAN GREEN, THE NORTHERN WTO AGENDA ON INVESTMENT:
DO AS WE SAY NOT AS WE DID 15-16 (2003).
57 Id.
58 Havana Charter, supra note 53, at art. 12, l(c)(iii).
'9 Id. at art. 12, l(c)(ii).
60 International Investment for Economic Development, Mar. 4, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. 49
(3d Supp. 1955).
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should use their best endeavors to create conditions that would foster the
cross-border flow of capital. Such endeavors would include providing
security for existing and future investment, avoiding double taxation, and
facilitating the transfer of earnings from foreign investments. Quite
importantly, it urged GATT Contracting Parties to enter into consultations
or participate in negotiations towards bilateral and multilateral agreements
to protect foreign investments. Similar urging regarding a multilateral
foreign investment framework was initially contained in Article 11:2(c),
asking the would-be ITO to "formulate and promote the adoption of a
general agreement or statement of principles regarding the conduct,
practices and treatment of foreign investment."61
On November 18, 1963, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution which welcomed a Joint Declaration of 75 developing
countries concerning the then soon-to-be held United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD I").62 Participating countries were
requested to seriously consider the content of the Joint Declaration.63
Besides urging that international law should play a more central role in
economic development, the Joint Declaration "called for the adoption of
measures which would expand trade between developing countries,
stabilize prices of primary products at fair and remunerative levels, expand
markets for manufactured goods, and provide more adequate financial
resources at favorable terms."6
In 1974, developing countries formulated their demands for change in
the form of resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly,
which together incorporated the call for a New International Economic
Order ("NIEO"). 65  The Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order ("NIEO Declaration") 66 was accepted by
consensus in the General Assembly and articulated the principal demands
of the developing countries for change and outlined the principles upon
which the proposed new order would be based.67 These included the
61 Havana Charter, supra note 55, at art. 11, T 2(c).
62 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I), G.A Res. 1897,
U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
63 Id.; Stanley D. Metzger, Developments in the Law and Institutions of International
Economic Relations, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 756, 759 (1967).
64 Metzger, supra note 63, at 759.
65 James Gathii has argued that "development" was the paradigmatic basis for many of
the concerns expressed by developing countries during this period. James Thuo Gathii, Good
Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social
Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 107 (1999).
66 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order ("NIEO
Declaration "), G.A. Res. 3201, 3202, U.N. GAOR, S-VI, Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974).
67 For instance, the NIEO Declaration called for a just and equitable relationship between
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principle of full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural
resources and all economic activities. In this regard, it was stated in the
NIEO Declaration that "each State is entitled to exercise effective control
over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation,
including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty
of the state."68 Article 4(f) stated the principle that "all States, territories
and peoples under foreign occupation, alien and colonial domination or
apartheid have the right to restitution and full compensation for the
exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural and all other
resources of those States, territories and peoples,, 69 while Article 4(h)
emphasized the "right of developing countries and the peoples of territories
under colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation to achieve
their liberation and to regain effective control over their natural resources
and economic activities."7° Finally, the NIEO Declaration aimed to
"[secure] favorable conditions for the transfer of financial resources to
developing countries."
'71
Among developed countries, there were serious misgivings that the
NIEO principles, particularly as outlined above, were "totally incompatible
and highly damaging to the standards of protection of foreign investment
established in customary international law. 72 The Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States ("CERDS") 7 3 passed later that year, was an
attempt to affirm and strengthen the legal principles intended to form the
basis of the NIEO.7 4 The language in CERDS was toned down somewhat
on the insistence of developed countries. One of the provisions that
remained intact, however, was Article 2, which gave States the right:
the price of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured and semi-manufactured
goods exported by developing countries, and the prices of raw materials, primary
commodities, manufactures, capital goods and equipment imported by them, with the aim of
bringing about sustained improvement in their unsatisfactory terms of trade and the
expansion of the world economy. Id. 4(j). The idea that world commodity prices should be
fixed in order to guarantee fair prices to exporters has never been acceptable to western
industrialized countries and their opposition to this idea, as well as to the NIEO in general,
never changed in any material way.




72 Eileen Denza & Shelagh Brooks, Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom
Experience, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 908, 909 (1987).
73 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter CERDS]. See also G.A.
Res. 3082, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1973).
74 G.A. Res. 40/182, U.N. GAOR 2nd Comm., 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 145, U.N.
Doc. A/40/53 (1985)
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To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State
adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and
regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In
any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy,
it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and
by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States
concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the
sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free
choice of means. 75
Many developing countries, most of which were newly independent,
took this treaty language very seriously, and many expropriations were
actually carried out. 6  Some writers have noted that: "[h]ardly a month
passed without some new confiscatory law landing on the desks of
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, filling the financial pages of the newspapers,
eroding the confidence of the prospective foreign investor.' ,77  Once
developed states realized that the charter was being used by developing
countries in such an assertive manner, the charter was denied legal authority
and status by many capital exporting countries, although it was passed by a
majority in the General Assembly.
78
75 CERDS, supra note 73, at 52. The use of the word "appropriate" here should be
juxtaposed with the customary law practice that had developed from the ruling of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorz6w Factory case, which stated:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a principle which
seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral
tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which restitution in kind would bear [must be made].
Factory at Chorz6w, (Germany v. Poland), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 1928)
(emphasis added).
76 Francesco Francioni noted:
One may wonder, in the light of the present realities of international affairs, when, on the one
hand, the gap between the countries that are rich and the countries that are poor is widening
instead of narrowing, and, on the other, an impressive new wave of nationalization measures
is taking place in many countries of the Third World.
Francesco Francioni, Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: Borderland
Between Law and Equity, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 255, 255-83 (1975).
77 Denza, supra note 72, at 909.
78 In regards to international trade, both the CERDS and the NIEO incorporated
principles that constituted a radical challenge to the existing international institutional
structures, and in particular to the GATT. The CERDS called for an expanded system of
trade preferences going far beyond the tentative steps of the GATT regime taken a few years
Bilateral Investment Treaties
26:95 (2005)
Increasingly, to guarantee what they considered to be better protection
for domestic investments, developed countries turned to bilateral
arrangements, where they could leverage greater bargaining power. Due to
the protests of developed countries, the NIEO Declaration was never tested
or implemented. The consequence of the failure to adopt the
recommendations in the NIEO Declaration was that the law on
compensation reverted to the judicial standard of "appropriate
compensation," which was interpreted to include future or potential benefits
of the expropriated enterprise or property. More importantly, through
bilateral agreements the de facto norm of full compensation emerged with
unquestionable clarity and legal authority.
IV. THE ERA OF BITS
In response to economic globalization, and following the orthodoxy of
multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank, developing
countries began to emphasize the need for foreign investment in order to
realize economic development. They immediately ran into the so-called
"problem of perception. 79 According to one writer, the "feeling of
insecurity" on the part of the many foreign investors who chose not to
invest in developing countries until they could secure agreements protecting
their investments was the major deterrent to the flows of FDI to developing
countries. In order to attract such foreign capital, many developing
countries stopped nationalizing foreign-owned assets in their countries and
began to enter into bilateral arrangements that ensured foreign investment
protection. Most African countries now do everything in their power to
create an environment that is conducive to FDI, which represents a tectonic
shift from the prevailing autarchic thinking of the 1970s.8 1 The vast
earlier with the authorization of the Generalized System of Preferences. While the radical
program of the NIEO was never implemented, the traditional institutions of the post-war
international economic order did make at least one important concession in principle to the
developing countries. A rather mild but real derogation from the GATT principle of non-
discrimination was adopted by the GATT's members in 1971 after several years of
discussion within UNCTAD and other fora.
79 The "perception problem" refers to the general idea that developing countries, and in
particular African countries, are unsafe for foreign investors.
80 Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the
Third World, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 58, 58-77 (1987).
81 Professor M. Sornarajah notes these changes in strategy in the following terms:
[M]uch of the 1970s was spent by developing States asserting their economic sovereignty
over foreign investments which entered their territory. Doctrines like permanent sovereignty
over natural resources have now become so stabilized that they are regarded as stating mere
truisms. Developing States have now moved away from this rhetorical stage into the
pragmatic stage, where the aim is to attract as much investment as possible into their territory
and ensure that such investment is harnessed to their developmental objectives.
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majority of these countries now universally welcome foreign investment
almost unreservedly, 82 have signed many BITs and have heavily engaged in
M. Somarajah, Protection of Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
Region, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 126 (Apr. 2005). In attracting foreign investment,
developing countries have to overcome the perception that they are "unsafe" destinations for
foreign capital. In a comprehensive and wide-ranging study conducted by the Consumer
Unity and Trust Society ("CUTS"), an Indian civil society organization, it was found, for
instance, that:
negative perceptions hamper the implementation of FDI policies. For instance investors may
feel insecure about, or lack confidence in South Africa due to a high crime rate, uncertainty
over property rights, government policies and political violence. There are also spillovers of the
Zimbabwe land crisis, the civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Sanchita Chatterjee, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries (Consumer Unity
and Trust Society, Investment and Development Project Report 2002). Developing
countries' quest for a greater share in global foreign investment flows has inspired much
literature in the past two decades. In particular, there has been a sustained focus on how to
manage the risks associated with the investment. See, e.g, Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephen
Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1 (1994). As Abba Kolo noted, "nothing is more important to maintaining the
profitability of international companies than the successful management of exposure to
political, economic, and financial risks." Abba Kolo, Managing Political Risks in
Transnational Investment Contracts, 1 CEPMLP INTERNET J. 4, 1, at
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/joumal/html/Voll/articlel-4.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
82 Several developing African countries have recently announced policies that welcome
foreign investment. See Gambia Woos Foreign Investors, BBC NEWS, July 4, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/2091010.stm; South Africa Targets More Investment, BBC
NEWS, Feb. 25, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/ 1840165.stm; Nigeria
Seeks Foreign Investment, BBC NEWS, Sept. 24, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1561585.stm; William Wallis, Nigeria Unveils Sell-Off
Plans, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2000, at 10; Victor Mallet, Mbeki Shifts the Emphasis to
Business, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at 7. See also Laith A1-Qasem, who noted that:
FDI has become an important developmental tool for counties [sic]. Large transnational
corporations have billions of dollars to invest in countries, which can provide needed services
and capabilities. Foreign direct investment once attracted is a substantially more stable form
of funding than either development assistance (aid) or loans. This should lead developing
countries to favor foreign direct investment over other types of capital flows. Additionally,
foreign direct investment appears to facilitate a one for one increase in domestic investment.
Laith AI-Qasem, Attracting Foreign Direct Investment as a Means of Developing ICT, at
http://www.worldbank.org/mdf/mdf4/papers/alqasem.pdf The importance of FDI in the
development of poor economies has also been recognized in a U.N. resolution. In December
1999, the Second Committee of the U.N. General Assembly approved a draft resolution
calling for the creation of an "enabling environment" for FDI to developing states. Press
Release, General Assembly Concluding Work for Fifty-Fourth Session, Second Committee




negotiations, especially those sponsored by UNCTAD.
On November 25, 1959, the first BIT was signed between Germany
and Pakistan. 83 During this early period, most BITs were signed between
developed and newly independent developing countries out of concern for
whatever foreign investments there were in the developing country or for
that which were foreseeable. Typically, the BITs were initiated by the
developed, capital-exporting country, with the usual objective being to
secure higher standards of legal protection and guarantees for the
investments of its firms than those offered under the national laws of the
capital-importing, developing country.84
Responding to the prevailing development orthodoxy, to the effect that
"foreign investment is good for you," skeptical developing countries, on the
other hand, signed BITs motivated by the desire to create an environment
favorable and attractive to foreign investors.85 Not surprisingly, in the
1960s, African countries signed more BITs than any other region in the
world.86 The current trend was that more and more BITs were being signed
as between developing countries; only 11 as between developed countries
because of the existing instruments adopted under the aegis of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD").
87
According to UNCTAD, this trend has continued. During the 1990s, for
example, the number of BITs increased by 279, from 149 at the end of 1989
to a total of 428.88 Out of these 428, 221 treaties were concluded with
developed countries (of which 172 were with members of the European
Union and 168 with developing countries), 44 were concluded between
African countries, 108 between Asian countries, 16 between Latin
American and Caribbean countries, and 39 between Central and Eastern
89European countries.
As will be discussed, over the years, it appears that a standard BIT has
developed from which countries see little need for departure. 90 The primary
83 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Nov. 26, 1959, F.R.G.-Pak., ICSID 92-93 (1992); SORNARAJAH,
supra note 16, at n.l; UNCTAD BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1999, at 57, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
84 Jiirgen Voss, The Protection and Promotion of European Private Investment in
Developing Countries, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 363, 363 (1981); Jeswald W. Salacuse,
BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign
Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655,655-75 (1990).
85 BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 83, at 1.
86 Id. at 5.
87 Id. at 4.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 5-6.
90 See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
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features have basically remained the same, especially regarding format,
objectives and major provisions. There are typically four or five sets of
major provisions. The first set usually outlines the scope and definition of
foreign investment. Often, the definition of investment includes both
tangible and intangible assets, direct and portfolio investments, and existing
as well as new investments. The second set of provisions deal with the
rules and conditions for admission of investments and focus on national,
most-favored nation ("MFN"), and fair and equitable treatment. In the third
set of provisions, the parties usually agree on some kind of guarantee and
compensation scheme regarding the loss of investment due to expropriation,
war or civil disturbances, guarantees of free transfer of funds and
repatriation of capital and profits, subrogation on insurance claims, and
State-to-State and investor-to-State dispute-settlement provisions. Not
uncommonly, the fourth set, which deal with issues related to but distinct
from those in the second set, touch on transparency and enforcement of
national laws, performance requirements, entry and movement of foreign
personnel, general exceptions, and extension of national and MFN
treatment to the entry and establishment of investments.
A. Trends in Provisions on the Definition of Foreign Investment
At the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment, developing
countries have insisted that they would prefer a "narrow" definition of
investment. In this regard, they have emphasized that the form of
investment they would welcome should be that which seeks to establish
lasting economic relations and thereby gives them the possibility of
exercising some effective control over its management. They have asserted
that they would be opposed to a definition of investment that covers both
FDI and portfolio investment, and both direct investment in enterprises and
direct investment in capital transactions. They perceive portfolio
investments and flighty investment in capital transactions to be speculative
and, with the wisdom of hindsight, potentially disruptive to their
economies.
Developing countries have, however, shot themselves in the foot
because most existing BITs have adopted a wide, open-ended definition and
coverage of investment that includes both FDI, and financial and other
portfolio investments. In the Germany-Namibia agreement, 9' the Germany-
Botswana agreement,92 and the Germany-South Africa agreement,
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J.
67 (2005).
91 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Jan.
21, 1994, F.R.G.-Namibia, art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?
id=779 [hereinafter Germany-Namibia Agreement].
92 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, May
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investment is very broad and includes inter alia: movable and immovable
property, shares of companies "and other kinds of interest in companies"
and "claims to money which has [sic] been used to create an economic
value or claims to any performance having an economic value. 9 4 This kind
of broad definition is also to be found in more or less similar wording in the
Germany-Burundi, 95 Netherlands-Nigeria, 96 France-Uganda, 97 Germany-
Kenya," United States-Cameroon, 99 United Kingdom-Lesotho,'0 ° United
Kingdom-Swaziland,' 0 1  Indonesia-Mozambique, 02  United Kingdom-
Angola, 10 3 Mauritius-Switzerland, 1' 4 Zimbabwe-Netherlands,0 5  and the
23, 2000, F.R.G.-Bots., art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779
[hereinafter Germany-Botswana Agreement].
93 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Sept.
11, 1995, F.R.G.-S. Aft., art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?
id=779 [hereinafter Germany-South Africa Agreement].
94 Germany-Namibia Agreement, supra note 91, at art. 1.
95 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Sept.
10, 1984, F.R.G.-Burundi, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779
[hereinafter Germany-Burundi Agreement].
96 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Nov. 2, 1992,
Neth.-Nig., at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779.
97 Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, Jan. 1, 2002,
Fr.-Uganda, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter
France-Uganda Agreement].
98 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, May
3, 1996, F.R.G.-Kenya, art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779
[hereafter Germany-Kenya Agreement].
99 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Apr.
7, 1986, U.S.-Cameroon, art. I, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-22 (1986) [hereinafter Cameroon-
United States Agreement].
100 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Feb. 18, 1981, U.K.-
Lesotho, art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter
U.K.-Lesotho Agreement].
101 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 5, 1995, U.K.-
Swaz., art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter
U.K.-Swaziland Agreement].
102 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 6, 1999, Indon.-
Mozam., art. I, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 (stating
"investment means every kind of asset admissible under relevant legal provisions of the
Contracting Party .... ) [hereinafter Indonesia-Mozambique Agreement].
103 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, July 4, 2000, U.K.-
Angl., art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter
U.K.-Angola Agreement].
104 Agreement on Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 26, 1999, Mauritius-
Switz., art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter
Mauritius-Switzerland Agreement].
105 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Nov. 12,
1996, Neth.-Zimb., art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779
[hereinafter Netherlands-Zimbabwe Agreement].
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Zambia-Netherlands' 0 6 agreements.
The letter of submittal of the Mozambique-United States agreement
0 7
expressly states that the definition of investment is broad, recognizing that
investment can take a wide variety of forms: "Evey kind of investment is
specifically incorporated in the definition."'0 8  The broad definitions of
"investment," "company" and "company party" also mean that investments
can be covered by the agreement even if ultimate control rests with non-
Party nationals subject to certain limitations in Article XII. The Botswana-
China agreement probably has the widest and most tortuous investment
definition: "every kind of asset invested by investors."'"1 Although there is
a list of what could be covered under "investment," the list is expressly
described as merely indicative and not exhaustive. In some of the older
BITs, such as in the Germany-Ethiopia agreement,"' investment was also
defined loosely and broadly as comprising "all categories of assets.' 
112
B. Trends in Provisions on Non-discrimination and Standards of Treatment
In general, WTO members have emphasized the importance of the
non-discrimination principle as one of the cornerstones of the multilateral
trading system. There has not been much recognition of the fact that non-
discrimination may be at odds with domestic development policies, which
may discriminate in favor of certain types of FDI that promote technology
transfer, capacity building and the creation of employment opportunities in
certain sectors or regions of the host country. Sound national policy could
also include special treatment of those foreign investors with favorable
environmental policies.
Clearly spelling out the standards of treatment for foreign investment
is usually a major objective of BITs. Most of those that have been signed
by African countries have the general "fair and equitable treatment"
standard as a prominent feature, most often at the outset, right after the
definitions section. A leading commentator has noted, however, that this
106 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Dec. 11,
1996, Neth.-Zambia, art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779.
107 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Dec.
1, 1998, U.S.-Mozam., art. I, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-31 (2000) [hereinafter Mozambique-
United States Agreement].
108 Id. (emphasis added).




11 Treaty Concerning the Promotion of Investments, Apr. 21, 1964, F.R.G.-Eth., art. 1,
at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter Germany-Ethiopia
Agreement].
112 See, e.g., id. at art. 8.
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general standard is "invariably combined with national and MFN
treatment."'1 13  Such a formulation is to be found, for example, in the
Zambia-Netherlands 14 and the South Africa-Netherlands agreements,
115
which provide similarly at Article 3(1):
Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment of the
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not
impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation,
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those
investors. Each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments full
physical security and protection.
Article 3(2) further provides that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall
accord to such investments treatment which in any case shall not be less
favorable than that which it accords to investments of its own investors or
to investments of investors of any third state, whichever is more favorable
to the investor concerned. 117
The import of these obligations being included in the same Article is
that an investor is entitled to the best treatment accorded by a host state to
its or other countries' investors, and at a minimum, treated fairly and
equitably-free from the whimsical or unreasonable demands or actions of
a host government. Largely similar provisions are found in the South
Africa-Greece agreement 8 and the South Africa-Sweden agreement.119
With some variations, it is also in the Botswana-Germany agreement, 120 the
113 Giorgio Sacerdoti, Private Foreign Investments in the Present International Economic
System: Financial Flows, Economic Functions and Legal Regulation, 269 RECUEIL DES
CouRs 251, 345 (1997).
114 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Apr. 30,
2003, Neth.-Zambia, art. 1, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779
[hereinafter the Zambia-Netherlands Agreement].
115 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, May 9,
1995, S. Afr.-Neth., at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779.
116 Id. at art. 3(1).
117 Id. at art. 3(2).
118 Agreement for Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Nov. 19, 1998,
Greece-S. Afr., at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter
South Africa-Greece Agreement].
119 Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, May 25,
1998, Swed.-S. Afr., at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779
[hereinafter South Africa-Sweden Agreement].
120 The Germany-Botswana Agreement states:
Each Contracting Party shall in its territory promote as far as possible investments by
national or companies of the other Contracting Party and admit such investments in
accordance with its legislation. It shall in any case accord such investments fair and equitable
treatment. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory
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Germany-Namibia agreement, 121 and the Botswana-China agreement.
22
The France-Uganda agreement 123 adds that the parties shall extend fair and
equitable treatment "in accordance with the principles of International
Law."1
24
This general reference to international law would implicitly seem to
incorporate other fundamental rules of customary international law
regarding the treatment of foreign investment. The scope of these rules of
international law is an open question. In addition to the provision on fair
and equitable treatment, the France-Uganda agreement has a separate
provision on national treatment and MFN treatment. 2 '
Although the Zimbabwe-Netherlands agreement 26 has provisions
exactly similar to those in the other agreements signed by the Netherlands
with most other African countries, including South Africa and Zambia, a
protocol to the agreement provides an addendum to Article 3 which states
that "treatment less favorable" within the meaning of that article shall not
apply in the acquisition of land or other immovable property, except when
such property is directly connected with an investment. 27 Similarly, the
Zimbabwe-Germany agreement exempts from the "treatment less
favorable" standard any "[m]easures necessary for reasons of public
security and order, public health or morality . . .."18 The United Kingdom-
Angola129and the United Kingdom-Mauritius 30 agreements also provide for
fair and equitable treatment, and national and MFN treatment under
separate articles.
The Mozambique-United States agreement is an interesting case of a
BIT with far-reaching provisions for the protection of investment. Article
measures the management, maintenance, use or enjoyment of investments in its territory of
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party.
Germany-Botswana Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 2.
121 Germany-Namibia Agreement, supra note 91, at art. 2.
122 Botswana-China Agreement, supra note 109, at art. 3.
123 France-Uganda Agreement, supra note 97, at art. 3.
124 Id.
121 Id. at art. 4.
126 Netherlands-Zimbabwe Agreement, supra note 105.
127 Protocol to the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Nov. 12, 1996, Neth.-Zimb., at http://untreaty.un.org.
128 Protocol to the Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Sept. 29, 1995, F.R.G.-Zimb., addendum to art. 3(a), at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779 [hereinafter Germany-Zimbabwe
Protocol].
129 U.K.-Angola Agreement, supra note 103, at art. 2(1).
130 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 20, 1986, U.K.-




2(1) provides for national treatment and MFN at both the entry and post-
establishment phases of the investment.13 ' This effectively rules out the
possibility that Mozambique could screen investment based on nationality
during the investment process itself, and also during the post-establishment
phase. It also introduces the "like situations" criteria, stating that according
to the parties, national treatment means treatment no less favorable than that
which a party accords, in like situations, to investments in its territory of its
own nationals or companies.' 32 Further, it states that MFN treatment, in the
understanding of the parties, means treatment no less favorable than that
which a party accords in like situations to investments in its territory of
nationals or companies of a third country. It also requires that under no
circumstances should a party accord an investor treatment less favorable
than that required under international law. 133 State trading enterprises are
explicitly included in the scope of the national treatment and MFN
obligations. Despite the variations in wording, the bottom-line is that the
vast majority of BITs contain some provision on the standard of treatment
for foreign investors. In this regard, there seems to be a settled practice that
a BIT would be seriously deficient without such a provision. It should be
clear from the foregoing discussion that non-discrimination and fair
treatment of a foreign investor have acquired such a high degree of
recognition that it is difficult to imagine a BIT that does not in some way
incorporate them.
C. Trends in Provisions on Dispute Settlement and Linkages with WTO
Dispute Settlement
Due to the nature and value of foreign investments, provisions on how
to resolve disputes between parties are usually a centerpiece of BITs.
Increasingly, parties are resorting to arbitration as a way of resolving
disputes. Citing data from the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), Luke Eric Peterson states that there is no
doubt that arbitration under BITs is on the rise, with BITs cases accounting
for 5 out of 12 new arbitrations in the year 2000, 12 out of 14 in 2001, and
15 out of 19 in 2002.135 The common provision on interstate dispute
131 Mozambique-United States Agreement, supra note 107, at art. 2(1).
132 Id.
"' Id. at art. 2(3).
134 Luke Eric Peterson, Research Note: Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration
and Sustainable Development (Aug. 2003), at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/
investmentinvestsdnote_
2003.pdf. See also Mark Freidman & Gaetan Verhoosel, Global Litigation-Arbitrating
over BIT Claims, NAT'L. L. J. , Sept. 15, 2003, at 15.
135 Freidman & Verhoosel, supra note 134, at 3 (noting that as of August 2003, 48 cases
were pending at ICSID and of these, 38 arose out of alleged violations of BITs).
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settlement in BITs is to the effect that should there be any differences
between the parties in the interpretation or application of the treaty, which
the parties have been unable to resolve through amicable or diplomatic
channels, it should, at the request of either party, be submitted to binding ad
hoc arbitration in accordance with specific rules laid down in each treaty.
The rules span the entire process of arbitration and are usually both
substantive and procedural. They spell out the composition of the
arbitration tribunal, its rules of procedure, liability for costs and the law to
be applied.
136
It is also not unusual to find BITs that refer parties to international
arbitration, especially in the event of an investor-state dispute with the
government of a host country. The procedures for such disputes are usually
well-established and have institutional backing. Thus, many bilateral
investment treaties provide for arbitration of investor-state disputes in
accordance with the ICSID Convention, while at the same time using the
procedural rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL") or the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC"). 137 No doubt international arbitration has been of unique benefit to
investor-state arbitrations, but it has been a rare occurrence in situations
where a dispute arises as between two states party to a BIT.
In the United Kingdom-Nigeria agreement,138 it is stated that the
preferred mode for the settlement of disputes between the Contracting
Parties is through diplomatic channels, in the failure of which either party
shall be free to submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal. Both parties also
consent to submit to ICSID for settlement by conciliation or arbitration
under the ICSID Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
136 See Mozambique-United States Agreement, supra note 107.
137 For example, a 1998 WTO paper points out that:
An important distinction regarding investor-state arbitration clauses in bilateral investment
treaties is that between treaties in which the parties express their advance, unqualified
consent to recourse to international arbitration by an investor of the other party and treaties in
which a specific expression of consent by a party in a given case is necessary in order for an
investor to be able to refer a dispute to international arbitration. Other differences that have
been noted with regard to investor-state arbitration clauses in bilateral investment treaties
relate to matters such as the scope of the disputes which can be referred to international
arbitration and whether or not resort to international arbitration and resort to domestic courts
are mutually exclusive.
See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Bilateral,
Regional, Plurilateral and Multilateral Agreements, Note by the Secretariat,
WT/WGTI/W/22, (Jan. 26, 1998), at http://docsonline.wto.org.
138 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 11, 1990, U.K.-
Nig., art. 9, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779.
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between States and Nationals of Other States.139 The Kenya-Germany
agreement 40 similarly provides that disputes between the Contracting
Parties concerning the interpretation of the treaty should first be resolved
through diplomatic channels, and when this fails, through an ad hoc
arbitration tribunal whose members shall be appointed by an agreed
procedure. Disputes between a Contracting Party and a national of another
Contracting Party should be resolved either amicably or through arbitration
in accordance with the ICSID Convention.14 1 Some BITs, such as the
Mauritius-Switzerland agreement, provide that the ad hoc tribunals
established to resolve an investor-state dispute will operate on the basis of
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules.
42
In the Mozambique-United States agreement, Article IX provides that
an investor-state dispute may be settled in three ways: 1) the dispute may be
submitted to the courts or administrative tribunals of the countries that are
parties to the dispute; 2) the dispute may be resolved by invoking the
dispute resolution mechanism previously agreed to by the national or
company and the host country; or 3) the dispute may be resolved by
invoking the dispute resolution mechanism identified in paragraph 3 of
Article IX. Paragraph 3 states that an investor can submit an investment
dispute to binding arbitration within 90 days of its having arisen. In this
case, the investor may choose between submitting the claim to ICSID or the
ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules or, in fact, any other arbitral
institution or rules that the parties may have agreed to. The agreement
provides that an aggrieved party can, in the interim, seek injunctive relief as
long as it does not seek a damages award from local courts. To safeguard
the enforcement of arbitral awards, the agreement provides that any
arbitration besides that under the ICSID Convention shall take place in a
country that is a party to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. Each party also commits itself to enforce
arbitral awards. Article X deals with state-state dispute resolution and
declares that this will be done through binding arbitration with specific
procedural aspects spelled out.
African countries are no strangers to investment disputes. As we have
seen in the brief survey, most BITs that they have signed provide an
arbitration clause usually referring disputes to the ICSID. For example in
Antoine Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi,143 Antoine Goetz, a
139 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 8, 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
140 Germany-Kenya Agreement, supra note 98, at art. 10.
141 ICSID Convention, supra note 139, at art. 11.
142 Mauritius-Switzerland Agreement, supra note 104, at art. 9.
143 Antoine Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, 6 ICSID Rep. 5 (2004). In 1995, the investors
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Belgian investor, filed the case with ICSID on the basis of consent to
arbitration under the ICSID Convention contained in the 1989 BIT between
the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and Burundi, arguing that the
withdrawal of a "free zone" certificate granting a series of tax and customs
exemptions to their investment in a precious metals business amounted to
an expropriation. There have also been dramatic cases recently, such as
Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo,144 in which the Minister
of Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo ordered the seizure of the
law chambers and a large sum of money belonging to the American law
firm Patrick Mitchell and Associates, which specialized in investment
law, 145 for the reason that the law firm was supporting rebels that were
fighting to overthrow the government of President Laurent Kabila.
At the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment, one of the
issues that has been widely discussed is what kind of dispute settlement
provisions should go into a multilateral framework on investment. It should
be noted that the possibility of a multilateral agreement on investment is
still very real at the WTO. Hence, it is important to highlight the issue of
inconsistency in dispute settlement procedures and remedies between what
may broadly be defined as the "international investment framework,"
comprising the various agreements that outline investment relations
between countries, and the rather limited WTO investment framework,
mainly TRIMs and the relevant provisions of GATS.
The current framework for investment and dispute settlement in the
WTO can be found largely in the TRIMs agreement, which prohibits
investment measures related to trade in goods that are inconsistent with the
basic requirements of the GATT. In this regard, TRIMs contains provisions
dealing with notification, transparency, non-discrimination, and balance-of-
payment problems. The GATS addresses foreign investment in that it
includes "commercial presence" as one of four modes of supply of services,
such as introducing FDI into the WTO. The agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights provides for the protection of
intellectual property rights as they relate to trade. It relates to investment in
went into arbitration with the host state, which ended in mutual settlement in favor of the
investors. Burundi was ordered to either compensate the investor or to reinstate their free-
zone status. Burundi agreed to reimburse the investors all taxes and customs they had paid,
amounting to almost $3 million, and to create a new free-zone regime. Arbitration as to
whether Burundi is complying with the settlement is on-going. See Disputes Before the
Center, 21 NEWS FROM ICSID 1, at 3 (Summer 2004), at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/news_2 1-1 .pdf.
144 Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ARB/99/7 (Nov. 30,
2004), at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mitchell-en.pdf (decision on stay).
145 Apparently the firm acted on behalf of a range of major clients such as Banro
Corporation, whose tin and gold mining concessions had been revoked by Kabila's
government. Banro mounted an unsuccessful effort to challenge that action in the ICSID. See
Banro American Resources, Inc. v. Congo, 17 ICSID Rep. 382 (2002).
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that it regulates the transfer of technology through FDI, a subject that is of
particular interest to developing countries looking to be at the receiving end
of technology transfers. Finally, the Uruguay Round Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU")
governs the dispute settlement of investment issues since each of the above
agreements are subject to the DSU.'46
It is important to distinguish the goals of dispute settlement from the
treatment thereof, in the context of trade and investment regimes. The goal
of the dispute settlement system within the WTO is to bring a country
member into compliance with its obligations vis-d-vis other members under
the WTO agreements. 147 The WTO system makes no provision for private
actors, as the system is set up to govern relationships between and among
states. While state-to-state disputes may arise, at the root of investment
disputes are private actors and the aim of the dispute settlement system
under an investment agreement is usually to provide direct relief to the
investor. As a result, BITs, and even some regional treaties, are structured
in ways that will accommodate investor-to-state dispute settlement
procedures, thus enabling private actors to bring an action against a state in
an international forum. The foundations for these types of provisions stem
from the principles of public international law that provide for state
responsibility for injury to aliens or injury to the property of aliens.
48
While trade disputes are resolved by the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB"), as highlighted earlier, BITs typically provide for the
resolution of investment disputes by way of arbitration in an international
forum, such as the ICSID or arbitration centers such as the International
Court of Arbitration of the ICC. More importantly, there is also a
significant difference in the form of relief provided. The remedies given in
arbitration awards in investment disputes typically provide for prospective
relief in the form of a compensation award. This position stems from the
so-called Hull formula, providing that "prompt, adequate and effective
compensation" is the most appropriate form of relief in an investment
dispute.1 49 Developing countries have also been willing to sign on to BITs
providing for compensation because BITs offer an opportunity to negotiate
146 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, art 1.1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/dsue.htm [hereinafter DSU].
147 See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules
Are Rules-Toward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 336 (2000); Joel
Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1999).
148 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 16, at 219.
149 Id. at 220. In general, capital importing countries (mainly developing countries) have
tended to oppose the applicability of the Hull formula in favor of the "partial compensation
formula." See id. at 258-59.
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and offer concessions to a potential investor in competition to and,
hopefully, at the exclusion of, other potential hosts. Most BITs also require
that state-to-state disputes be settled by consultations, failing which the
dispute is submitted for arbitration. The arbiter renders a decision, which
may include a compensation award.
Under the WTO agreements, however, the emphasis is on obliging a
Member to bring its practices into compliance with the agreement without
requiring retrospective relief. To the extent that compensation is provided,
it is usually as a way to ensure compliance and is on a voluntary basis only.
Moreover, the TRIMs agreement, as a non-comprehensive investment
agreement, is devoid of a provision for the repatriation of capital
expropriation and compensation issues. Thus, the current WTO framework,
and particularly the dispute settlement framework, is at odds with the
standards that have been developed in international law for the settling of
investment disputes. In terms of Article 3.7 of the DSU, the primary
objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure the withdrawal
of trade measures found to be inconsistent with the WTO agreements, and
thereby facilitate trade. 150 Anything short of this, for example the payment
of compensatory market access or retaliation, is a further anomaly which
negates the overall objective of free unhindered trade between WTO
members.
Compensation is available as a temporary measure and only if the
immediate withdrawal of the trade measure is impracticable. Article 3.7 of
the DSU explicitly privileges compensation over the suspension of
concessions.' However, the system is set up in such a way that
compensation is not always a viable option while suspension of concessions
often is. According to Article 22.2, members have to enter into negotiations
with the other party with a view to "develop mutually acceptable
compensation., 152 Not only is the possibility of reaching a mutually-agreed
decision on compensation considerably low, the DSU provides for only 20
days after the expiry of the reasonable period of time to end negotiations,
usually as considered by the offended WTO Member and determined as a
matter of practice taking into consideration the complexity of the issues in
the dispute.
53
The result is that retaliation becomes the optimal remedy to dispute
settlement. However, retaliation does not necessarily work in favor of
developing countries, especially in the case of retaliation by a developing
country against a developed country, where the developed country can
afford to continue a violation despite the retaliation. In addition, it could be
"0 DSU art. 3.7.
151 Id.




economically self-defeating for a developing country to suspend
concessions and in the process lock out vital imports. Moreover, retaliatory
measures may in fact provoke counter retaliation measures in non-trade
related fields such as development aid. The recommended measure
therefore is to enhance and improve the current provision in the DSU
dealing with compensation. One way of doing it would be to provide that
the panel make a recommendation on the level of nullification or
impairment at the time of issuing its report. In determining the level of
nullification and impairment, the complaining member will have to provide
sufficient information to enable the panel to make an objective assessment.
If there is a failure to bring the inconsistent measure into compliance
within the reasonable time period, the recommended level of nullification or
impairment is treated as a compensation award and comes into effect.
15 4
The complaining member should then have the option of invoking the
compensation award or requesting authorization from the DSB to suspend
concessions. The recommendation diverges from the current agreement in
two major respects. First, compensation is not negotiated by the members
that are party to the dispute, but is a remedy that is decided upon by an
adjudicating third party. This strengthens the provision and brings the
WTO framework closer to conformity with the international investment
framework, in which the decision of the arbitral tribunal is in most instances
binding upon the parties. Second, it loses its nature as a voluntary option
for the member in violation of the agreement and provides the complaining
member, for whom retaliation is an unrealistic option, with an alternative
tool to ensure compliance and restore the imbalance created by the
inconsistent measure. The most appropriate remedy within the WTO
framework should still be for a member to bring its measures into
compliance with the WTO agreements. A stronger compensation
mechanism, though, would not only encourage compliance overall, but also
serve to improve developing countries' positions in the dispute settlement
process.
D. Trends in Provisions on Investment Protection
Because "[n]ationalization poses the greatest threat to foreign
investment,"1 55 all BITs signed by African countries, as is true for all BITs
worldwide, have specific provisions laying down the conditions -under
which expropriations and nationalizations can be carried out by a party.
The provisions also deal with compensation claims and how such claims are
to be settled. The discernible trend is that now, for various public purposes,
"it is generally accepted that a State has a right to nationalize foreign-owned
154 Id. at art. 22.1.
155 SORNARAJAH, supra note 16, at 253.
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property, subject to certain exceptions," 156 usually spelled out in BITs. The
level of compensation is mostly contested however, and as some
commentators have noted, "it is idle to pretend that the position in
customary international is other than uncertain."' 157 What is clear, however,
is that nationalization and expropriation without some form of
compensation is increasingly a rare occurrence. Most countries accept that
compensation will be paid. It is unlikely that this issue will be contested by
developing countries, even if negotiations were to commence at the WTO
on a multilateral agreement on investment. Already, as pointed out, all BITs
contain a provision along these lines. What might be problematic will be the
level of compensation and how it will be determined.
E. Trends in Provisions Restricting Outward Capital Flows
The ability to freely and promptly transfer funds related to foreign
investment (such as profit, dividends, royalties and others), in freely and
easily transferable currency is always a major concern of foreign investors.
Currency restrictions and difficulties in remittance of funds are said to
discourage foreign investors. The liberalization of capital markets in most
of Africa, and the free convertibility of most African currencies into hard
currencies, was viewed as a way of creating an environment conducive to
foreign investment. Due to inadequate foreign exchange reserves, however,
and the importance of such reserves in avoiding currency and price
volatility, some countries in Africa have put in place currency
externalization and capital movement restrictions. Usually, this is in
keeping with their development strategies.
It is not surprising, therefore, that most BITs that have been signed by
African countries have a provision devoted to making sure that parties to
such agreements have the leeway to transfer funds out of the country
whenever the need arises. In the United Kingdom-Swaziland agreement it
is provided that:
Each Contracting Party shall in respect of investments guarantee to
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party the unrestricted
transfer of their investments and returns. Transfers shall be effected
without delay in the convertible currency in which the capital was
originally invested or in any other convertible currency agreed by the
investor and the Contracting Party concerned. Unless otherwise agreed
by the investor, transfers shall be made at the rate of exchange
applicable on the date of transfer pursuant to the exchange regulations in
156 Id.
157 Eli Lauterpacht, Issues of Compensation and Nationality in the Taking of Energy




In the United Kingdom-Lesotho agreement, it is provided that "Each
Contracting Party shall in respect of investments guarantee to nationals or
companies of the other Contracting Party the free transfer of their capital
and of the returns from it. ' 59  The Mozambique-Indonesia agreement
provides for similar rights for transfer of investment capital and returns,
adding that all transfers shall be effected without delay in any convertible
currency at market rates 160 but that "in the absence of a market exchange
rate, the rate to be used will be the most recent exchange rate applied to
inward investments or the most recent exchange rate for conversion of
currencies in special drawing rights, whichever is more favorable.' 61
In Article 5, the Mauritius-Switzerland agreement provides for free
transfer of investment capital returns similar to the Namibia-Germany1
62
and Zimbabwe-Germany163  agreements. In Article V: I of the
Mozambique-United States agreement, each party agrees to "permit all
transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without
delay into and out of its territory" in "freely usable currency" and at the
prevailing market rate of exchange. An indicative and non-exhaustive list
of transfers that must be allowed is provided. A surprisingly friendly
provision in paragraph 4 allows a party to prevent a transfer through the
equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of laws relating to
bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors,
securities, criminal or penal offences, or ensuing compliance with orders or
judgments in adjudicatory proceedings.
F. Trends in Provisions on Investment Incentives and Performance
Requirements
By their mere signature, countries usually aim to create a degree of
legal security through BITs. Hence, they do not go out of their way to
actually provide for financial or other economic undertakings in
incentivizing foreign investors. Because foreign investment is often
perceived as a tool for economic development, especially by African
countries, many of the investor-incentive programs are agreed upon in
mutual bilateral cooperation between the host and source states, mostly
158 U.K.-Swaziland Agreement, supra note 101, at art. 6.
159 U.K-Lesotho Agreement, supra note 100, at art. 6.
160 Indonesia-Mozambique Agreement, supra note 102, at art. VI(1).
161 Id. at art. VI(2).
162 Germany-Namibia Agreement, supra note 91, at art. 5.
163 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Sept. 29, 1995, F.R.G.-Zimb., art. 5, at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?
id=779 [hereinafter Germany-Zimbabwe Agreement].
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regardless of what is contained in BITs. Some authors have noted the
absence of incentive schemes in BITs and stated that it is "consistent with
the obvious principle that no State can be compelled to grant preferential
treatment to foreign investors, though it may of course elect to freely do
so."' 64 However, there are a number of general "investment promotion"
provisions. The word "promotion" in this sense could include incentive
schemes. An example of a BIT in which the parties agree to promote
investment from the other would include the United Kingdom-Mauritius
agreement, where each party agrees to "encourage and create favorable
conditions for nationals or companies of the other party to invest capital in
its territory. 165  Close language is also to be found in the Zimbabwe-
Germany agreement, 66 United Kingdom-Angola agreement, 67 Germany-
Ethiopia agreement, 68 and the Zambia-Netherlands agreement. 69
Some BITs also preclude parties from imposing performance
requirements as a condition to establishment, expansion or maintenance of
investments. The United States-Mozambique agreement prohibits either
party from mandating or enforcing specified performance requirements as a
condition for establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct
or operation of a covered investment. 70 Article VI exhaustively lists the
prohibited requirements as being: domestic content requirements, domestic
purchase preferences, the balancing of imports or sales in relation to exports
of foreign exchange earnings, requirements to export products or services,
technology transfer requirements, and requirements relating to the conduct
of research and development in the host state. According to the last
sentence of Article VI, however, it is possible that conditions can be
imposed "for the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage."',
71
G. Trends in Provisions on Entry, Movement and Employment of Personnel
Most major multinational companies doing business in Africa usually
have foreign nationals, Europeans or Americans depending on the
nationality of such corporations, at the top of the management structure. At
the lower levels, these companies often employ nationals of the host state.
Many BITs usually provide enough safeguards to ensure that foreign
investors are able, first, to hire staff and have them gain entry and
residential stay in the host state, and second, to ward off any economic
164 Sacerdoti, supra note 113, at 365.
165 U.K.-Mauritius Agreement, supra note 130, at art. 2.
166 Germany-Zimbabwe Agreement, supra note 163, at art. 2.
167 U.K.-Angola Agreement, supra note 103, at art. 2.
168 Germany-Ethiopia Agreement., supra note 111, at art. 1.
169 Zambia-Netherlands Agreement, supra note 114, at art. 2.




policies in the host state that may preclude them from hiring top managers
from any country, usually their home countries.
Of course, in most BITs there is a rider providing that such hiring
policies have to be consistent with the national or domestic policies of the
host state. In reality however, the clout that foreign investors have and the
awe with which they are held in most African countries is such that they
can get away with sometimes appalling human resource policies.
Nevertheless, it is a common requirement that any national of a contracting
party who wishes to seek entry and stay in a host state be accorded
favorable treatment and that his purpose upon entry is connected with, or
generally necessitated by, an investment.
In the Botswana-China agreement, for example, it is provided:
"Subject to its laws and regulations, one Contracting Party shall provide
assistance in and facilities for obtaining visas and work permits to nationals
of the other Contracting Party engaging in activities associated with
investments made in the territory of that Contracting Party.' ' 172 Some other
BITs are less clear, for example the Canada-South Africa agreement simply
states that "Each Contracting Party shall encourage the creation of favorable
conditions for investors of the other Contracting Party to make investments
in its territory.' 73  It would be reasonable to expect, however, that
favorable conditions here would include assistance in obtaining visas and
work permits in connection with investments.
Article VII of the United States-Mozambique BIT requires that each
party allows, subject to its laws relating to entry and sojourn of aliens, the
entry into its territory of the other party's nationals for certain purposes
related to a covered investment and involving the commitment of a
"substantial amount of capital.' 74 Built into this provision is a safeguard
against possible abuse of the claim for investor visas to both countries, by
limiting them only to investors that will commit a substantial amount of
capital. What is substantial capital is also a question of interpretation, but
for certain, what will be insignificant capital in the United States will most
certainly be deemed substantial capital in Mozambique. Paragraph 1(b)
precludes any restrictions that the parties may impose simply because of
numbers-Mozambique could never restrict entry of American investors
even if one sector of its economy was totally dominated by such investors.
At paragraph 2, the BIT requires that each party should allow covered
investments to engage top managers of their choice, regardless of the
nationality, although such personnel must independently qualify for an
appropriate visa for entry into the territory of the other party, and further, it
172 Botswana-China Agreement, supra note 109, at art. 2.
173 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 27, 1995, Can.-S.
Afr., art. 11(1), at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch.aspx?id=779.
174 Mozambique-United States Agreement, supra note 107, at art. VII.
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does not give such personnel an automatic right of entry into a party's
territory. This provision on the freedom to hire top managers from any part
of the world "reflects the existence of a world market for professional
competencies" and "remind[s] us of... the manifold restrictions, to which
... movement across borders is currently subject, while trade and
movements of funds is being liberalized at an increasing pace. 175
V. WILL BITS GIVE RISE TO A COHERENT CORPUS OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?
There has been some debate among scholars as to whether, in fact, the
commonality in the provisions of BITs could some day lead to a
universalized corpus of customary international law on foreign
investment. 76  The contrary view is that BITs create a lex specialis as
between the parties and their provisions and, no matter how uniform in
practice will therefore never advance to the level of customary law
norms.177 And further, that "the popularity of BITs should not be taken as
evidence in support of customary international law.
178
Some commentators take the view that "[i]t is possible that an
accumulation of bilateral treaties which subscribe to the same standard of
conduct could make that standard of conduct a principle of customary
international law."' 79 The bottom line remains, however, that despite
objections by developing countries to the possibility that there are universal
standards on foreign investment, they actually have in practice signed
bilateral treaties reaffirming their support for the basic standards
highlighted above and some of the traditional standards, such as the Hull
rule of compensation. Collectively, this will make it difficult for them to
intelligently object to a multilateral framework that encapsulates the
standards they have already accepted at the individual state level through
BITs.
As discussed in Part IV, developing countries have engaged in an
175 Sacerdoti, supra note 113, at 357.
176 See Asoka de Z. Gunawardana, The Inception and Growth of Bilateral Investment
Promotion and Protection Treaties, 86 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 544, 550 (1992) (stating
that although the provisions of bilateral investment treaties may not have attained the status
of customary international law, they will undoubtedly contribute towards the development of
such principles).
177 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of
Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 327, 329 (1994) (stating that "each
BIT is nothing but a lex specialis between parties designed to create a mutual regime of
investment protection.")
178 Andrew T. Guzman, Explaining the Popularity of BITs: Why LDCs Sign Treaties that
Hurt Them, (Jean Monnet Working Papers, No. 12/97 § VII, 1997), at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-12.html.
179 SORNARAiAH, supra note 16, at 226.
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extensive exercise of BIT-signing to overcome the perception that they are
unsafe destinations for foreign investment. Despite this, however, many of
them continue to attract foreign investment, particularly in the unprocessed
goods and extractive natural resources sectors. In attempting to regulate
such foreign investment flows, they have entered into a number of BITs,
most of which are initiated by developed countries. Many African
countries enter into BITs with the hope that they may provide a measure of
guarantee to potential foreign investors that their investments will be
welcome and safe. The central theme in this paper has been that in the
process, these countries have made concessions that they would have found
unthinkable in the past, when autarchic economic policies were prevalent,
and that will eventually work against their ability to credibly resist a
comprehensive multilateral agreement on investment.
In supporting the central theme, this paper has examined some of the
major provisions in a number of BITs. This survey reveals that in broad
terms, BITs cover four areas: the scope of application of the treaty; market
access; establishment and investment protection; and dispute settlement. In
this article, we have focused mainly on various categorizations of the four
broad concepts, with the intention of demonstrating to what extent African
countries have bound themselves to obligations that they may find in a
future multilateral foreign investment framework. The finding that there is
a broad similarity in the key BIT provisions invites the never-ending debate
as to whether in fact BITs give effect to existing international law
principles. Whichever position one takes in this debate, the bottom-line is
that African countries have precluded the chance to advance a defensible
argument, particularly for a multilateral investment framework in the
context of the WTO.
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Annex I
Selected bilateral, regional and inter-regional agreements containing FDI
provisions concluded or under negotiation, 2003-2004
Year I Title Setting Level Status
Developing countries
Africa
2004 ACP-EU Economic ACP- Inter- Under
Partnership Agreement European regional negotiation
Community
2004 CEMAC-EU Economic CEMAC Inter- Under








2004 Economic Partnership ECOWAS Inter- Under
Agreement between (Economic regional negotiation
ECOWAS and the Community





2004 Egypt-Singapore Free Trade Egypt- Bilateral Under
Agreement Singapore negotiation
2004 Economic Partnership ESA Inter- Under
between Eastern and (Burundi, regional negotiation
Southern Africa and the Comoros,


















2004 Free Trade Agreement SACU Bilateral Under










2004 SADC-EU Economic SADC Inter- Under






Asia and the Pacific




Asian Nations and Japan
2003 Chile-Republic of Korea Chile- Bilateral Adopted
Free Trade Agreement Republic of
Korea
2003 Closer Economic China-Hong Bilateral Adopted
Partnership Arrangement Kong
between China and Hong (China)
Kong (China)
2003 Mainland and Macao China-Macao Bilateral Adopted
(China) Closer Economic (China)
Partnership Arrangement
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Republic of India and the
Association of South East
Asian Nations
2003 Framework Agreement for India- Bilateral Adopted
Establishing Free Trade Thailand
Area Between the Republic
of India and the Kingdom of
Thailand
2003 Singapore-Australia Free Singapore- Bilateral Adopted
Trade Agreement Australia
2004 Bahrain-United States Free Bahrain- Bilateral Adopted
Trade Agreement United States
2004 Framework Agreement on India, Regional Adopted





2004 Singapore-Jordan Free Singapore- Bilateral Adopted
Trade Agreement Jordan
2004 Framework Agreement on SAARC Regional Adopted




2004 ASEAN-Republic of Korea ASEAN- Bilateral Under
Republic of consultation
Korea
2004 ASEAN-CER ASEAN- Inter- Under
Australia- regional negotiation
New Zealand
2004 Bahrain-Singapore Free Bahrain- Bilateral Under
Trade Agreement Singapore negotiation
2004 India-Singapore India- Bilateral Under
Comprehensive Economic Singapore negotiation
Cooperation Agreement
2004 Korea, Republic of Republic of Bilateral Under
Singapore Free Trade Korea- negotiation
Agreement Singapore
2004 SAARC agreement on the South Asian Regional Under




2004 Sri Lanka-Singapore Sri Lanka- Bilateral Under
Comprehensive Economic Singapore negotiation
Partnership Agreement
2004 Thailand-United States Free Thailand- Bilateral Under
Trade Agreement United States negotiation
Latin America and the Caribbean






2004 Agreement Between the CARICOM Bilateral Adopted
Caribbean Community (Caribbean
(CARICOM), Acting on Community
Behalf of the Governments and Common
of Antigua and Barbuda, Market)-
Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica
Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago, and the
Government of the Republic
of Costa Rica
2004 Free Trade Agreement Andean Inter- Adopted









Free Trade Agreement of Americas Regional Under
the Americas negotiation
Andean Community- Andean Bilateral Under
Canada negotiation
Andean Community-United Andean- Bilateral Under
States Free Trade United States negotiation
Agreement
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Brazil-Russian Federation Brazil- Bilateral Under
Russian negotiation
Federation
CARICOM-EFTA CARICOM- Inter- Under
EFTA regional negotiation
CARICOM-EU CARICOM- Inter- Under
European regional negotiation
Community
Costa Rica-Panama Free Costa Rica- Bilateral Under
Trade Agreement Panama negotiation
Mexico-Singapore Free Mexico- Bilateral Under
Trade Agreement Singapore negotiation
Source: UNCTAD.
